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Abstract 
 
Existing research links CEO overconfidence to a number of corporate decisions including 
overinvestment, external acquisitions, and earnings management. These findings raise the 
question of whether counterparties distinguish between differences in CEOs, and how they 
respond to it. We focus on two key counterparties – auditors and credit rating agencies – and 
examine whether audit fees and credit ratings are affected by CEO overconfidence. We find a 
positive association between audit fees and CEO overconfidence, suggesting that auditors exert 
more effort or increase the risk premium associated with auditing firms with more 
overconfident CEOs. We also find a significant negative association between CEO 
overconfidence and credit ratings, suggesting that overconfident CEOs are associated with 
higher agency costs of debt and higher credit risk. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent studies empirically examine how CEO characteristics affect decisions such as 
acquisitions, leverage, earnings management, management forecasting, and tax avoidance 
(e.g., Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Frank and Goyal 2007; 
Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Hribar and Yang 2012; 
Schrand and Zechman 2012).2 In some cases, researchers looks for common characteristics by 
identifying and following CEOs as they change firms over time, without specifying the 
underlying characteristics of the executives that drive their decisions. In other cases, 
researchers attempt to identify ex-ante characteristics that are expected to affect decisions in a 
predicted direction. The common theme across these studies is the premise that individual 
psychology is a persistent determinant of important corporate decisions. However, a less 
explored consequence of these studies is the extent to which parties that transact with the firm 
recognize the CEO’s personality and modify their contracts with the firm (explicitly or implicitly) 
to account for the anticipated effect of the CEO’s personality on key firm decisions.  
Because an individual’s personality is a multi-dimensional construct, we focus on one 
dimension of CEO personality that has been studied extensively in recent finance and 
accounting literature: overconfidence. Prior research suggests that overconfidence can 
manifest itself in two ways.  First, it is associated with the “better-than-average” effect, where 
individuals tend to overestimate their ability relative to average (Larwood and Whittaker 1977).  
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 The first strand of research documents the existence of “manager styles” (i.e., manager fixed effects) across 
several corporate decisions (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Frank and Goyal 2007; Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; 
Dyreng et al. 2010; Yang 2012). The second stream of research examines the effect of a specific individual trait 
(e.g., overconfidence) on firms’ investment, financing, forecasting, and earnings management decisions 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Hribar and Yang 2012; Schrand and Zechman 2011). 
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This can manifest itself as excessive optimism with respect to outcomes tied to individual 
ability.  Second, overconfidence is associated with “too narrow confidence intervals”, where 
individuals underestimate the variance associated with random processes.  This leads to 
miscalibration, where the subjective probability distributions with respect to uncertain events 
are too narrow.  Both dimensions of overconfidence contribute to the corporate outcomes that 
have been associated with overconfident CEOs, such as forecast issuance, increased optimism 
and precision in forecasts, greater capital expenditures and M&A activity, and lower quality 
financial reporting (Malmendier and Tate 2005; 2008; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Libby and 
Rennekamp 2012; Hribar and Yang 2012).  In contrast to these studies, however, we examine 
whether counterparties identify and respond to CEO overconfidence when contracting with the 
firm. 
We examine two different counterparties that are likely to be affected by CEO 
overconfidence, auditors and credit rating agencies.  In our first setting, we examine whether 
firms’ auditors charge different fees depending on the CEO’s level of overconfidence. There are 
several reasons why CEO overconfidence could affect audit fees. First, a more overconfident 
CEO should increase litigation risk because of the direct link between CEO overconfidence and 
financial reporting decisions. For example, Schrand and Zechman (2012) find overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to commit accounting fraud based on SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Additionally, Hribar and Yang (2012) find that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to voluntarily issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts which could 
increase the pressure to manage earnings to meet these expectations. 
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Second, overconfidence could increase litigation risk because of the investment 
decisions and how these affect financial reporting. Prior studies document that overconfident 
CEOs tend to engage in non-value maximizing activities such as excess investment and 
unsuccessful acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). When managers engage in value-
destroying activities, they also are more likely to engage in earnings management to mask bad 
outcomes from their decisions (Christie and Zimmerman 1994).   
Third, the extent of CEO overconfidence affects audit fees directly through the required 
level of audit effort. Audit texts and the COSO framework suggest that “tone at the top” is an 
important consideration when assessing the control risk of a firm.3 Additionally, theory on CEO 
overconfidence demonstrates that overconfident CEOs underinvest in information acquisition 
and provide information of poorer quality to shareholders and the board (Goel and Thakor 
2008). This theory suggests that auditors will need to increase substantive testing to maintain a 
desired level of overall audit risk for firms with poorer internal information environments due 
to CEO overconfidence.  
In our second setting, we examine whether credit analysts incorporate CEO 
overconfidence when analyzing the firm’s credit risk. Agency theory suggests that one of the 
key components of the agency cost of debt is the ‘asset substitution’ or ‘risk incentive’ problem 
identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The main argument is that managers will substitute 
riskier projects because their equity position can be viewed as a call option on the firm, and call 
options have values that increase in the risk of the underlying asset.  As such, the agency cost of 
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 COSO considers “tone at the top” an important factor when describing management’s responsibility for 
maintaining a positive control environment in their Internal Control – Integrated Framework report (COSO 1992). 
Similarly, AU Section 319 requires auditors to obtain sufficient understanding of a firm’s internal control 
environment by inquiring and observing management in planning the audit.  
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debt is increasing in the amount of leverage. Combining this with research on the investment 
effects of overconfidence suggests that agency costs of debt will be higher if CEOs are more 
overconfident. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find more overconfident CEOs exhibit 
a tendency to overinvest, and rely more heavily on debt financing. Frank and Goyal (2007) 
further show that managerial fixed effects are important for explaining the amount of 
leverage,. These studies provide a direct link between CEO overconfidence and investing and 
financing choices, both of which increase the agency costs of debt. 
Also, similar to auditors, credit rating agencies cite “tone at the top” as an important 
consideration in their rating decisions. For example, in their 2008 Corporate Ratings Criteria, 
Standard & Poor’s notes that evaluation of top management is “an input for both business risk 
and financial risk profiles – reflecting the fact that management’s strategy, decisions, and 
policies affect all aspects of a company’s activity” (S&P 2008, p. 32). We therefore predict that, 
as with audit fees, the degree of overconfidence exhibited by the CEO will affect the ratings 
issued by credit rating agencies.4 
Auditors and credit rating analysts share some characteristics that make them good 
research settings to examine how counterparties respond to CEO behavior. First, both parties 
have access to management and, therefore, are able to perform their own assessment of the 
CEO’s personality. Second, the nature of the relationship between the firm and both auditors 
and credit rating agencies is such that overconfidence has a predictable effect on the role being 
served by the counterparties.  For the firm, there are additional benefits to overconfidence that 
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 Our analysis complements the work of Sunder, Sunder, and Tan (2010), who find that bond investors restrict 
merger and investment activities of overconfident CEOs through the use of direct restrictions on investment and 
through financing restrictions. 
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can make it optimal to hire overconfident CEOs despite the potential investment and financial 
reporting costs.  For example, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) show that overconfident CEOs 
are better innovators and are more likely to exploit growth opportunities, while Gervais et al. 
(2011) show that overconfidence can offset risk aversion and lead to corporate actions that are 
more aligned with shareholders’ risk preferences.  Yet, in the case of the counterparties we 
examine, it is difficult to perceive the benefits to contracting with an overconfident CEO.   As 
discussed above, existing research shows that overconfident managers are prone to making 
business decisions (e.g., overinvestment, poor acquisitions, overly optimistic forecasts, and 
earnings management) that directly affect both the auditing of financial statements and 
issuance of credit ratings.  This allows us to make directional predictions for the effect of 
overconfidence on both audit fees and credit ratings. 
We measure the level of CEO overconfidence in two ways.  First, following past research, 
we determine the relative extent of overconfidence based on popular press characterizations of 
the CEO (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2008; Jin and Kothari 2008; Hirshleifer et al. 2012; Hribar 
and Yang 2012).  Specifically, we use a sample of 974 CEOs listed on the Fortune 500 from 2000 
to 2007, and determine whether the CEO is more or less overconfident based on the 
descriptions of the CEO in published articles. Because we are interested in CEOs that fall on 
both ends of the overconfidence spectrum, we define search terms to capture characteristics 
that are expected to be both positively and negatively associated with overconfidence. We use 
the frequency of these descriptions to place the CEO on the overconfidence continuum. 
Following Hribar and Yang (2012), we measure this trait at the CEO level (not CEO-year level) 
since overconfidence should be relatively stable across time. This approach also reduces the 
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possibility of unidentified omitted variables that influence both the press characterizations and 
the counterparty’s response, and minimizes the likelihood that other (unidentified) time-
varying economic events explain our results. Our second measure combines the press-based 
characterization with information about CEO option-exercising behavior and the extent of 
management forecast bias.  We use factor analysis to extract the common variance from these 
three variables and use this as a second proxy for overconfidence. 
Following Simunic (1980), we define audit fees as a function of (1) audit effort and (2) 
the present value of expected losses to the auditor from being involved with the company’s 
audit. The second component typically arises from litigation. We expect auditors to consider 
firms with more overconfident CEOs to require more audit effort and to have a higher litigation 
risk. As such, we expect to observe a positive association between the extent of CEO 
overconfidence and audit fees. We identify a set of determinants based on prior literature that 
we expect to be associated with audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980; Larcker and Richardson 2004; 
Hanlon, Krishnan, and Mills 2012; Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008). The 
determinants are intended to measure the resources required to complete the audit, including 
various proxies for size and complexity. Controlling for these determinants, we observe a 
significant positive association between CEO overconfidence and audit fees. We also examine 
whether changes in the CEO are associated with changes in audit fees. We find that when a firm 
hires a new CEO who is characterized as more overconfident, auditors respond by increasing 
fees.  
To examine the association between CEO overconfidence and credit ratings we convert 
Standard & Poor’s senior debt ratings from letters into numbers, with larger numbers indicating 
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a higher rating. We then estimate an ordered logistic regression controlling for firm 
characteristics such as size, profitability, and risk that prior research has shown are associated 
with the cost of debt (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-
Harris 2002). Our results indicate a significant negative association between credit ratings and 
the extent of CEO overconfidence. This result is consistent with credit analysts preferring less 
overconfident managers and reducing their rating for firms with highly overconfident CEOs. We 
also estimate a changes specification, in which we examine changes in credit ratings in 
response to changes in CEO overconfidence, again based on CEO turnover. Consistent with our 
expectations, we find that replacing the existing CEO with a more overconfident CEO is 
negatively associated with changes in credit ratings.  
One challenge with our research is that we are interested in modeling the effect of 
overconfidence on audit fees and credit ratings after controlling for the behavior that is 
predicted by overconfidence. Stated differently, we are interested in showing that CEO 
overconfidence affects contracting even after controlling for the outcomes predicted by 
overconfidence, such as acquisitions and earnings management. We predict that after 
controlling for the business decisions made by overconfident CEOs, the counterparties will still 
incorporate the level of overconfidence in their fees and credit ratings because of the 
anticipated future actions of the CEO or potential opaque actions taken by the CEO.   
Consistent with credit rating agencies considering qualitative firm attributes, recent 
credit reports by both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s for Chesapeake Energy specifically 
mention the firm’s CEO and discuss the fact that the company’s aggressive risk profile reflects 
the CEO’s dominant role at the firm. In discussing concerns over the CEO’s personal financing 
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transactions, the Moody’s report notes, “These issues further confirm our existing views 
regarding the CEO’s dominant role at Chesapeake and his strong influence on the company’s 
risk appetite and growth objectives.”(Moody’s 2012, p. 5). In general, we expect that CEO 
overconfidence provides auditors and credit analysts with a useful signal about both litigation 
risk and credit worthiness beyond the information conveyed by other firm characteristics.  
If auditors and credit analysts can identify and contract on CEO overconfidence, this 
raises the question as to why boards of directors cannot also screen CEO candidates on this 
trait. As mentioned previously, the benefits from overconfidence might lead a board to prefer 
these characteristics, when the firm is in a position to benefit from riskier actions. In this study, 
we do not attempt to resolve whether boards efficiently choose candidates with traits that 
meet the firm’s current strategic needs or whether CEOs simply impose their unique style on 
whatever firm they run. We assume that boards act on behalf of shareholders when they 
choose their CEOs and at least attempt to identify CEOs with traits that will benefit 
shareholders. However, regardless of whether boards are efficient in choosing CEOs, the 
potential benefits of riskier actions taken by an overconfident CEO are not shared by auditors or 
credit analysts and therefore are expected to result in higher audit fees and lower credit 
ratings.    
Our paper contributes to three areas of research. First, we extend the literature that 
examines the association between managerial characteristics and corporate decisions. Our 
analysis suggests counterparties can observe the personality traits of executives and contract 
with the firm accordingly. We conclude that, in addition to the direct costs stemming from the 
suboptimal business decisions of overconfident CEOs, there are significant indirect costs 
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imposed by counterparties that bear risk associated with these decisions. Second, we extend 
research examining the determinants of audit fees by showing that auditors increase fees when 
managers exhibit characteristics that increase the auditors’ litigation risk. Third, we increase the 
understanding of the factors credit rating agencies use in evaluating firms’ creditworthiness. 
Consistent with the claims made by the agencies, our results suggest that credit ratings factor in 
an assessment of management characteristics.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
prior literature. Section 3 describes the sample selection and variable definitions. We discuss 
the research design and empirical results for tests of the association between CEO 
overconfidence, audit fees, and credit ratings in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 
concludes the paper.   
II. Hypothesis Development   
2.1 Audit Fees and CEO Overconfidence 
O’Keefe, Simunic, and Stein (1994) find auditors charge higher fees for riskier clients. 
Using confidential survey data, Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford (2001) find that when auditors 
deem a firm’s inherent risk to be high, they respond by increasing the number of audit hours. 
Krishnan, Pevzner, and Sengupta (2011) point out that both the risk of earnings management 
and litigation risk increase auditors’ expected losses because they increase the probability of 
litigation against the auditor. Reynolds and Francis (2000) note that auditors risk losing 
reputational capital if their clients were sued. Building on the premise that auditors increase 
fees when they deem accounting quality to be low, Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson (2011) find that 
the unexplained component of audit fees is positively associated with future restatements and 
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cases of fraud. Together, these studies suggest audit fees contain information about auditors’ 
private assessment of the fraud and litigation risk posed by their clients.    
Our objective is to determine whether auditors consider aspects of the CEO’s 
personality when making their assessment of the business risk posed by their client.5 Existing 
research about the effect of CEO overconfidence on business decisions suggests that CEO 
overconfidence could serve as a red-flag to auditors of increased litigation risk. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) predict that overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment 
projects and view external financing as overly costly. Consistent with their predictions, they find 
that CEOs who are identified as being overconfident choose investments that are significantly 
more sensitive to cash flow than those investments that other CEOs choose. Hribar and Yang 
(2011) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to miss their own forecasts of earnings. 
Overly optimistic earnings forecasts and suboptimal investments might provide strong 
incentives for overconfident CEOs to manage earnings in order to mask their poor performance.  
 Consistent with overconfident CEOs being under excessive pressure to manage earnings, 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) find overconfident CEOs are more likely to commit accounting 
fraud. They argue that overconfident managers are likely to view earnings shortfalls as 
temporary and are therefore more inclined to engage in earnings management that they 
believe will be obscured by strong future performance. Schrand and Zechman (2012) speculate 
that when performance does not improve, the overconfident CEO is forced to engage in more 
egregious forms of earnings management, eventually culminating in fraud. As such, the degree 
                                                          
5
 We define an auditor’s business risk as the risk the auditor will suffer losses because of their association with a 
particular client stemming from either litigation or impairment to the auditor’s reputation.  
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to which the CEO is either more or less overconfident represents a useful signal to auditors of 
increased fraud risk and litigation risk.  
The above research is somewhat one-sided in that it primarily portrays the costs of CEO 
overconfidence, and raises the question why firms would hire or retain overconfident CEOs in 
equilibrium. However, overconfidence is a characteristic that also has advantages. For 
example, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that overconfident CEOs are more innovative in that they 
generate more patents.  Also, Gervais et al. (2011) argue that innate overconfidence can 
overcome some of the risk aversion of managers, as they perceive actions as less risky in 
general, which can help align the manager’s risk preferences with those of shareholders. Finally, 
given that one effect of overconfidence is a higher variance of outcomes due to the riskier 
project selection (Goel and Thakor 2008), overconfidence might be associated with likelihood of 
promotion in the labor market as overconfident managers are more likely to have more 
extreme good realizations.   
Our paper examines whether overconfidence also affects the counterparties that 
contract with the firm. We expect auditors to take into account the greater risk and amount of 
effort required to audit firms with overconfident CEOs. Goel and Thakor (2008) analyze the 
behavior of managers and show that CEOs who are overconfident about their private 
information underinvest in information acquisition, leading them to provide information of 
lower quality to investors and the board.6  If overconfidence leads to suboptimally low 
information production and a poorer internal information environment, then we expect 
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 The implicit assumption here is that information production is not the CEO’s primary task, which is consistent 
with CEOs being mainly responsible for strategic, operational, and financial decisions. 
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auditors to also take these shortcomings into account when assessing their required level of 
audit effort. Overall, this leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Audit fees are positively associated with CEO overconfidence. 
Of course, in order for the CEO’s personality to be a useful signal, the auditor must be 
able to distinguish more overconfident CEOs from less overconfident ones, and understand the 
implications of overconfidence for the business risk posed by a client. Consistent with auditors 
being able to identify and understand the implications of CEO overconfidence, Krishnan et al. 
(2011) find auditors charge higher fees for firms issuing frequent and optimistic management 
forecasts. Similarly, Hogan and Wilkins (2008) find audit fees are higher in the year prior to 
disclosure of internal control deficiencies for a sample of firms with disclosed deficiencies. 
These studies, however, do not delineate whether the auditors adjust their fees as a response 
to the observed optimism in management forecasts, the likelihood of earnings management, or 
the personalities of the CEOs that give rise to these outcomes. In order to determine whether 
the actual traits of the CEO provide auditors with incremental useful information, our research 
design attempts to measure individual traits directly, and then control for the outcomes of 
business decisions that prior research has shown to be associated with overconfidence (e.g., 
acquisitions and abnormal accruals).  
We do not make any predictions about the association between CEO overconfidence 
and the quality of internal controls. The above discussion and hypothesis are based on the 
expectation that overconfident CEOs increase the inherent risk of the audit. Auditors are 
expected to attempt to mitigate this increased inherent risk by increasing substantive testing in 
order to maintain the same level of audit risk and/or by increasing the fee premium in exchange 
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for accepting a higher level of audit risk. In either scenario, the result will be increased audit 
fees in response to CEO overconfidence.  
2.2 Credit Ratings and CEO Overconfidence 
The second setting where we examine how counterparties respond to CEO personality is 
credit ratings. Similar to auditors, debtholders bear agency costs associated with excessively 
risky or optimistic decisions of overconfident managers. Although shareholders can benefit 
from risky project choices that increase the variance of the firm’s future cash flows, these 
investments are likely to increase default risk to the detriment of the debtholders. Similar to 
auditors, credit analysts are expected to have private access to management, assess the 
personal traits of top executives, and use this information. For these reasons, we believe that 
credit ratings is another powerful setting to examine how counterparties respond to CEO 
personality.  
Credit ratings have important implications for bond yields and bank capital 
requirements. These ratings are likely to be of particular importance to firms with 
overconfident CEOs because existing research shows overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity 
financing in favor of either debt or internal funds (Malmendier and Tate 2005). Sunder et al. 
(2010) build on this work by examining how debt investors contract with firms with 
overconfident CEOs. Sunder et al. (2010) predict bondholders will require more covenant 
protection for firms with overconfident CEOs because these CEOs have a tendency to 
overinvest. They find evidence consistent with bondholders placing additional restrictions on 
the investments of firms with overconfident CEOs. To the extent that bondholders place 
additional restrictions on firms with overconfident CEOs and those restrictions reduce the 
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likelihood of future default, we might not observe an association between credit ratings and 
CEO overconfidence. However, Malmendier and Tate’s (2005, 2008) finding – that 
overconfident CEOs tend to overinvest and make more value-destroying acquisitions – suggests 
that these additional investment restrictions are insufficient to prevent CEOs from making 
suboptimal decisions.  
In addition to the research linking overconfidence to investment decisions, a second 
reason to expect a negative association between overconfidence and credit ratings is the 
relationship between overconfidence and quality of accounting information. Hribar and Yang 
(2012) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts with greater 
error and optimistic bias. Schrand and Zechman (2012) find a positive association between CEO 
overconfidence and incidence of fraud. Together, these results suggest that firms with 
overconfident CEOs produce lower quality accounting information. Financial reports provide 
credit analysts with a starting point to forecast future cash flow amounts, volatility, and 
sources. Credit markets also react significantly to information in management forecasts 
(Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang 2011). Consequently, less reliable sources of 
information for forecasting cash flows are likely to be associated with lower credit ratings. This 
leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Credit ratings are negatively associated with CEO overconfidence. 
Similar to our analysis of audit fees, we control for the outcomes of overconfident CEOs’ 
decision making when establishing the link between CEO personality and credit ratings. 
Because Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) find that higher accrual quality is 
positively associated with credit ratings, we include a control variable for accrual quality in our 
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credit rating model. Our objective, then, is to determine whether credit analysts’ assessment of 
the CEO’s personality is incrementally informative about variation in credit ratings.  
III. Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
We start with a sample of 640 firms and 974 CEOs listed in the Fortune 500 during the 
period of 2000 through 2007. We eliminate firms in the financial services industry (SIC codes 60-
69) and observations that are missing audit fee data in Audit Analytics. We require observations 
to have sufficient data in Compustat to compute a set of control variables in the audit fee model. 
Our selection criterion results in a sample of 490 firms, 758 CEOs, and 2,833 firm-years, which 
we refer to as the audit fee sample. To test the association between credit ratings and CEO 
personality, we further require observations to have Standard & Poor’s senior debt ratings and 
sufficient data in Compustat to compute a set of control variables in the credit rating model. This 
procedure results in a sample of 369 firms, 568 CEOs, and 2,158 firm-years, which we refer to as 
the credit rating sample. 
Our measure of overconfidence uses popular press characterizations of the CEO.  Unlike 
measures based on equity holdings or option-exercising behavior, press characterizations are 
not a choice of the CEO, and are less susceptible to concerns about endogeneity or omitted 
variables. We search for articles that mention CEOs in the New York Times, Business Week, 
Financial Times, the Economist, Forbes, Fortune, Time, and the Wall Street Journal. We look for 
words that describe the CEO and are either positively or negatively associated with 
overconfidence.  Specifically, we count the number of articles describing the CEO as confident or 
optimistic as indicators of greater overconfidence, and conservative or not confident as 
indicators of lesser overconfidence. Specifically, we use the search terms “confident” or 
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“confidence” [Confident]; “optimistic” or “optimism” [Optimistic]; “conservative”, “reliable”, 
“steady”, “practical”, frugal”, or “cautious”  [Conservative]; and “not confident” or “not 
optimistic” [Not Confident].7 We also count the number of articles that describe the CEO during 
the whole sample period (TOTAL) to control for total press coverage of a CEO. Using these 
statistics, we construct a measure of CEO personality that is increasing in CEO overconfidence as 
follows:  
CONF_CON = [(Confident+ Optimistic)-(Conservative + Not Confident)] / TOTAL.  
CONF_CON is a continuous variable that measures the relative frequency with which a 
CEO is described as confident or optimistic versus as conservative or not confident. Note that 
CONF_CON is fixed over time for each CEO since Confident, Optimistic, Conservative, Not 
Confident, and TOTAL are article counts for the entire sample period.8 Libby and Rennekamp 
(2012) show that overconfidence stems in-part from stable individual traits. For this reason we 
do not allow our measure of CEO overconfidence to vary over time. In addition to the 
continuous measure of CEO personality (CONF_CON), we also construct a discrete variable that 
takes the value of one (minus one) [zero] if the number of articles characterizing the CEO as 
confident or optimistic is greater than (less than) [equal to] the number of articles describing the 
CEO as conservative or not confident. We refer to this variable as CONF_DIS. Similar to 
CONF_CON, CONF_DIS is increasing in overconfidence.9  
                                                          
7
 While it is possible for CEOs to use more confident/optimistic language around specific firm events, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) and Hribar and Yang (2011) do not find systematic differences between article types (i.e., 
confident or optimistic mentions) and sources (i.e., journalist, CEO, other), which mitigates the concern that the 
press mentions are driven by contemporaneous economic events.   
8
 Refer to Hribar and Yang (2011) for more detailed information about the construction of the measures of CEO 
overconfidence. 
9
 For consistency with prior research, the set of CEOs that are more often described as confident or optimistic are 
referred to as “overconfident”, despite the fact that this measure does not allow us to calibrate the appropriate 
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As a second measure, we construct a measure of CEO overconfidence as the first factor 
(FACTOR) obtained from conducting a factor analysis on the continuous press-based measure of 
overconfidence (CONF_CON), an options-based measure of overconfidence (DELAYOPTIONS), 
and the management earnings forecast bias (BIAS). Following Schrand and Zechman (2012), we 
use the value of the CEO’s unexercised but exercisable options on Execucomp to construct 
DELAYOPTIONS. We obtain this measure by computing the log of the mean value of each CEO’s 
unexercised but exercisable options. We then assign this value to years in which data on 
unexercised but exercisable options are available for each CEO, as well as years in which 
information about the CEO’s unexercised but exercisable options are not available. We ascribe 
these identifiable values to the missing data points because we believe that the individual trait 
of interest should be stable across time. We include the optimistic bias in management forecasts 
as a proxy for CEO overconfidence because Hribar and Yang (2012) find that overconfident CEOs 
are more likely to provide optimistic forecasts. To construct BIAS, we compute the mean of the 
difference between each CEO’s earnings forecasts and actual earnings, scaled by beginning-of-
year price.10 Similar to the construction of DELAYOPTIONS, we then assign this value to years in 
which CEOs issue management earnings forecasts, as well as years in which CEOs do not. 
IV. Audit Fees and CEO Overconfidence 
4.1 Research design 
We test the association between audit fees and CEO overconfidence by estimating the 
following regressions for the audit fee sample: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
level of confidence. However, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that this measure is highly correlated with their 
proprietary measure of overconfidence using CEOs’ equity portfolio holdings.  
10
 We restrict the sample to point management earnings forecasts and retain the last forecast for forecasts with 
multiple revisions. 
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LNAUDFEES is the log of audit fees and CONFIDENT represents our measures of CEO 
overconfidence (CONF_CON, CONF_DIS, and FACTOR). The definitions of the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. To control for potential serial and cross-sectional correlations among 
residuals, we cluster standard errors by CEO and include year indicator variables. We also 
include industry indicator variables to control for industry fixed effects. 
We identify a set of control variables based on prior research on determinants of audit 
fees (Simunic 1980; Gul, Chen, and Tsui 2003; Hanlon et al. 2012). We include the log of total 
assets (LNASSETS), the number of business segments (BUS SEG), the ratio of foreign sales to total 
assets (FGN), the ratio of inventory to total assets (INV), the ratio of receivables to total assets 
(REC), and the ratio of debt to total assets (DEBT) to control for the complexity of the audit and 
the resources required for the audit. We also include operating income deflated by total assets 
(INCOME) and an indicator variable that takes the value of one when income is negative and 
zero otherwise (LOSS) to proxy for inherent risk. Audit Opinion (AUD OPIN) is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified audit opinion and 0 otherwise, where a 
modified audit opinion is defined as anything other than a standard unqualified audit opinion 
coded as 1 by Compustat. CLIENT is a proxy for the importance of the client to the audit firm 
measured as the number of years that a firm has been a client of its auditor. We include an 
industry-based indicator variable (LITRISK) to proxy for litigation risk (Francis, Philbrick, and 
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Schipper 1994). The log of the absolute value of total accruals (LNABSTACC) and the log of the 
absolute value of book-to-tax differences (LNABSBTD) are included to proxy for a firm’s 
accounting quality. ICD is an indicator variable set equal to one for firms receiving a qualified 
opinion on their internal controls, and zero for all other observations. M&A is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm engages in mergers and acquisitions, where sum of the 
deal values is greater than 5% of total assets, and zero for all other observations. We expect 
audit effort and fees to increase in the presence of M&A. Finally, we include the total number of 
articles for the entire sample period (TOTAL).11 
Next, we investigate whether changes in CEO overconfidence that stem from a change in 
the CEO are associated with changes in audit fees. Because we define overconfidence as a stable 
individual characteristic, changes in overconfidence can only occur with CEO turnover. To the 
extent that firm characteristics are relatively stable in two adjacent years, a changes model helps 
mitigate potential concerns that our findings are attributed to unobserved heterogeneity in firm 
characteristics. All variables are defined as in the previous specification. Specifically, we estimate 
the following equation: 
            
                                                         
                                                 
                                                             
                       
                                                          
11
 All of the control variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles except for TOTAL, BIG4, BUS SEG, LOSS, 
AUD OPIN, CLIENT, LITRISK, ICD, and M&A. 
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To control for potential inter-temporal and cross-sectional dependence among residuals, 
we cluster standard errors by CEO and include year indicator variables.  
4.2 Empirical results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. The average 
CONF_CON is 0.017 with a median of zero, while the percentage of CEOs classified as 
overconfident is 26% using the discrete measure. A CEO receives an average of approximately 67 
press mentions during our sample period and 99% of the firms in our sample are audited by a 
Big 4 audit firm. Panel A of Table 2 displays the correlations for the audit fee sample. As 
expected, all three proxies of CEO overconfidence (CONF_CON, CONF_DIS, and FACTOR) are 
positively and significantly correlated with LNAUDFEES. Consistent with prior literature, 
LNAUDFEES is positively correlated with the variables that proxy for firm complexity, such as 
LNASSETS, BUS SEG, FGN, and REC. LNAUDFEES is also positively correlated with LNABSTACC and 
LNABSBTD, two variables that proxy for accounting quality. Overall, the correlation analyses 
provide preliminary evidence that audit fees are positively associated with CEO overconfidence. 
We do not observe a significant correlation between either measure of CEO overconfidence and 
DEBT. Malmendier and Tate (2005; 2011) argue that overconfident CEOs prefer debt to equity, 
but this preference is conditional to cases where the firm is underfunded. As such, the 
insignificant association between CEO overconfidence and DEBT is not necessarily surprising.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
Table 3 provides the estimation results of equation (1). As predicted, Model 1 reveals 
that the coefficient estimate on CONF_CON is positive and statistically significant (β1=1.082, p-
value=0.001). Model 2 finds that our discrete measure of CEO personality also exhibits a 
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statistically significant positive coefficient (β1=0.120, p-value=0.001). The coefficient on FACTOR 
is also positive and significant (β1=0.057, p-value=0.022). Overall, these results are consistent 
with auditors charging lower audit fees for clients with CEOs that are less overconfident. To 
assess the economic significance of the association between audit fees and CEO personality, we 
examine increases in audit fees when we move from the first quartile to the third quartile of 
CONF_CON. We find that moving from the first quartile to the third quartile of the distribution of 
CONF_CON increases audit fees by $1.04 million.12 The increase comprises 29% of the mean 
audit fees ($1.04 million/$3.58 million), which suggests that CEO overconfidence has an 
economically significant impact on audit fees.13 
[Insert Table 3] 
The estimation results of equation (2) are presented in Table 4. The findings are 
qualitatively consistent with those in Table 3. The coefficient estimates on ΔCONF_CON and 
ΔCONF_DIS are positive (β1=0.152 for ∆CONF_CON and β1=0.056 for ΔCONF_DIS) and the 
coefficient estimate on ΔCONF_DIS is significant (p-value=0.01). This is consistent with auditors 
increasing audit fees when a client hires a new CEO that exhibits greater overconfidence. 
Changing from a less overconfident CEO to a more overconfident CEO also appears to have 
economically significant impact on audit fees. Moving from a less overconfident CEO to a more 
                                                          
12
 The increase in fees is calculated as EXP (0.033 × 1.082) = $1.04 million. 
13
 In supplemental analysis (untabulated) we partition our overconfidence measure into two separate measures. 
The first measure (OVER_CON) is equal to CONF_CON when CONF_CON is > 0 and OVER_CON = 0 otherwise. The 
second measure (CONSERVATIVE_CON) is equal to -1 * CONF_CON when CONF_CON is < 0 and 
CONSERVATIVE_CON = 0 otherwise. Interestingly, when we re-estimate equation (1) and examine these two 
components separately both are associated with audit fees in the predicted direction (β1=1.349, p value =0.000 for 
OVER_CON and β1=-0.814, p value = 0.111 for CONSERVATIVE_CON). This result suggests the observed association 
between our measure of overconfidence and audit fees is because firms with less overconfident CEOs are charged 
lower audit fees and firms with more overconfident CEOs are charged higher audit fees.  
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overconfident CEO for a given firm increases audit fees by 6%.14 However, inconsistent with 
expectations, the coefficient estimate on FACTOR is negative and insignificant. Taken as a whole, 
the findings of Table 3 and Table 4 support our hypothesis that audit fees are positively 
associated with the level of CEO overconfidence. 
[Insert Table 4] 
V. Credit Ratings and CEO Overconfidence 
5.1 Research design 
  To examine whether CEO overconfidence is associated with credit ratings, we estimate 
an ordered logistic regression for the credit rating sample as follows:   
               
 
                                     
                                                        
                                                            
       
Standard & Poor’s assigns senior debt ratings ranging from AAA to D to debt issuers. We 
convert Standard & Poor’s senior debt ratings from these letters into numbers ranging from 20 
to 1 with larger numbers indicating a higher rating (RATINGS). Again, CONFIDENT alternates 
between our measures of CEO overconfidence (CONF_CON, CONF_DIS, and FACTOR), and is 
increasing in CEO overconfidence. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. To control 
for potential inter-temporal and cross-sectional dependence among residuals, we cluster 
standard errors by CEO and include year indicator variables.  
                                                          
14
 The increase in fees is calculated as EXP (0.056) = 1.06. 
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We select a battery of determinants that prior work has shown are associated with credit 
ratings (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ahmed et al. 2002; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Cheng 
and Subramanyam 2008). To proxy for a firm’s financial risk, we include variables that capture 
firm characteristics: the ratio of debt to total assets (DEBT), the ratio of operating income to 
total assets (INCOME), an indicator variable that equals one when a firm reports negative 
income and zero otherwise (LOSS), the log of the interest coverage ratio (LNINT_COV), the log of 
total assets (LNASSETS), the capital intensity (CAP_INTEN), an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one when shareholder equity increases and zero otherwise (CHAEQ), the ratio of R&D to 
total assets (RD), buy-and-hold raw stock returns over the past three years (RET), the standard 
deviation of RET (SDRET), the standard deviation of INCOME (SDINCOME), and the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value of equity (MB). We include Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) 
accrual quality measure (AQ) and a measure of transparency from Gu (2002) (TRANSP) to control 
for information risk. We also include a firm’s corporate governance quality (GINDEX) as in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Finally, we include the total number of articles for the entire 
sample period (TOTAL).15 
Next, we examine whether changes in credit ratings are associated with changes in the 
CEO’s personality due to CEO turnover. Because our dependent variable, RATINGS, has high 
autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors by CEO to account for potential inter-temporal 
dependence among residuals when estimating equation (3). Additionally, estimating a changes 
specification of equation (3) provides an alternative way of accounting for such a problem. All 
                                                          
15
 All of the control variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles except for TOTAL, LOSS, CHAEQ, 
TRANSP, and GINDEX. 
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variables are defined as in the previous section. Specifically, we estimate a changes model as 
follows: 
            
                                                  
                                                   
                                             
                              
 
5.2 Empirical results 
Descriptive statistics for the additional variables used to test H2 are provided in the 
bottom panel of Table 1. The average credit rating for our sample firm is 13, which is equivalent 
to a BBB+ rating on the S&P rating scale, while the average Gompers’ governance score is 9.83. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlations for the credit rating sample. The correlation 
between RATINGS and CONF_CON (CONF_DIS) is not distinguishable from zero. Contrary to our 
expectations, RATINGS is positively associated with FACTOR. We, however, note that univariate 
correlation results should be interpreted with caution since LNASSETS is strongly positively 
correlated with RATINGS as well as all three measures of CEO personality. Our primary research 
question is to examine whether firms’ credit ratings are systematically related to CEO 
personality after controlling for other covariates, such as size and risk. As predicted, RATINGS is 
negatively correlated with DEBT, LOSS, RET, SDRET, and SDINCOME, whereas it is positively 
correlated with INCOME, LNINT_COV, LNASSETS, and RD. The results for the information risk 
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proxies suggest that TRANSP is positively correlated with RATINGS, while AQ is negatively 
correlated with RATINGS. 
Table 5 displays the results of estimating equation (3). Results are consistent with our 
predictions. The coefficient estimate on CONF_CON is significantly negative (β1=-1.148, p-
value=.013). CONF_DIS and FACTOR also have negative and statistically significant coefficient 
estimates (β1=-0.341, p-value=0.005; β1=-0.200, p-value=0.010). We interpret these results as 
indicating that credit analysts assign lower credit ratings for firms that have CEOs that are 
characterized as more overconfident.16  
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (4). The results are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in Table 5. The coefficient estimate on ∆CONF_CON remains 
significantly negative (β1=-1.218, p-value=0.004). The coefficient estimate on ∆CONF_DIS also 
stays significantly negative (β1=-0.455, p-value=0.006). The coefficient on FACTOR is negative, 
but not significant (β1=-0.069, p-value=0.318). The results presented in Table 6 are consistent 
with credit rating analysts downgrading credit ratings when a firm replaces a less overconfident 
CEO with one who is characterized as more overconfident.  
[Insert Table 6] 
                                                          
16
 Similar to our supplemental analysis of audit fees, we again partition CONF_CON into two separate measures 
and examine the association with credit ratings. The first measure (OVER_CON) is equal to CONF_CON when 
CONF_CON is > 0 and OVER_CON = 0 otherwise. The second measure (CONSERVATIVE_CON) is equal to -1 * 
CONF_CON when CONF_CON is < 0 and CONSERVATIVE_CON = 0 otherwise. When we re-estimate equation (3) and 
examine these two components separately, both are associated with credit ratings in the predicted direction (β1=-
1.198, p value =0.021 for OVER_CON and β1=1.212, p value = 0.144 for CONSERVATIVE_CON). This finding suggests 
the observed association between our measure of overconfidence and credit ratings is a result of firms with less 
overconfident CEOs receiving higher credit ratings and firms with highly overconfident CEOs receiving lower ratings. 
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Because it is difficult to assess the economic impact of CEO personality on credit ratings 
in an ordered logistic model with multiple categories, we estimate an alternative model that 
classifies observations into two categories, as in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006). Specifically, we 
create an indicator variable (INVTGRADE) that takes the value of one if a firm’s credit rating is 
BBB or higher, and zero otherwise. We then estimate the binary logistic regression using 
INVTGRADE as a dependent variable. The specification is as follows: 
             
                                              
                                                 
                                                  
                 
 
The estimation results presented in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 5. The 
coefficient estimates on CONF_CON and CONF_DIS are negative and significant (β1=-1.112, p-
value=0.038; β1=-0.358, p-value=0.065) while the coefficient estimate on FACTOR is also 
negative but insignificant (β1=-0.047, p-value=0.372). 
[Insert Table 7] 
In order to assess the effect of CEO overconfidence on the likelihood of having an 
investment-grade credit rating relative to a speculative-grade credit rating, we calculate the 
changes in the probability of receiving an investment-grade credit rating when changing from a 
conservative CEO to an overconfident CEO. Results reveal that the likelihood of receiving an 
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investment-grade credit rating decreases by 13.5%.17 To provide the economic significance of 
this relative to other determinants of credit ratings, we assess the economic significance of LOSS, 
which is one of the primary variables used to proxy for a firm’s default risk. Moving from LOSS=0 
to LOSS=1 decreases the probability of receiving an investment-grade credit rating by 18.8%.18 
The probability changes of receiving an investment-grade credit rating due to changes in CEO 
personality is 72 percent of the probability changes due to the occurrence of a loss. Overall, we 
conclude that CEO overconfidence has an economically significant impact on the probability of 
receiving an investment-grade credit rating versus a speculative-grade credit rating.  
Collectively, the findings reported in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 provide strong 
support for our hypothesis that credit ratings are negatively associated with CEO 
overconfidence.  
VI. Conclusion 
A number of recent studies have documented an association between overconfidence 
and corporate decisions. In some cases, corporate decisions made by overconfident executives 
are likely to be costly to shareholders (e.g., overinvestment and fraud), while in other cases 
they benefit shareholders at the expense of debt holders (e.g., risky project selection). The 
tendency of CEOs with different personalities to make these decisions has important 
implications for other counterparties to the firm. This circumstance naturally leads to the 
questions whether counterparties are able to identify CEO overconfidence and whether they 
adjust their contracts accordingly. We examine two important counterparties whom the 
decisions of an overconfident CEO are likely to impact. We find that auditors charge higher fees 
                                                          
17
 All other variables except for indicator variables are held constant at their means.  
18
 All other variables except for indicator variables are held constant at their means. 
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when the CEO is more overconfident and increase audit fees when firms replace a less 
overconfident CEO with a more overconfident one. We also find that credit rating agencies 
assign lower credit ratings to firms with overconfident CEOs and lower their credit ratings when 
firms replace a less overconfident CEO with a more overconfident CEO. 
Our paper is subject to several limitations. First, because we focus on Fortune 500 firms, 
our sample size is necessarily small and not representative of the underlying population of firms 
with audit fees and credit ratings. Second, press portrayals of CEOs may be correlated with 
contemporaneous firm events. Thus, we attempt to address this concern by using a CEO-
specific measure and alternative proxies. Finally, although our changes analysis provides us with 
significant (albeit weaker) results and reduces concerns about correlated omitted variables, we 
cannot completely eliminate the possibility that our findings are attributable to economic 
events that simultaneously lead to CEO turnover and an increase in audit fees or a decrease in 
credit ratings.    
Subject to these caveats, our results provide evidence that counterparties are able to 
identify CEO personality and modify the way they contract with the firm accordingly. Our 
analysis contributes new insight into our understanding of the sophistication of both auditors 
and credit analysts and the determinants of both audit fees and credit ratings. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
Overconfidence Proxies 
CONF_CON Continuous CEO fixed overconfidence variable 
CONF_DIS Discrete CEO fixed overconfidence variable    
FACTOR 
The first factor obtained from a factor analysis of CONF_CON, DELAYOPTIONS, and BIAS, in 
which DELAYOPTION is the log of exercisable but unexercised option holdings and BIAS is the 
management earnings forecast bias 
Variables in Audit Fee Regressions 
LNAUDFEES Log of audit fees   
TOTAL Number of articles for each CEO for the entire sample period   
BIG4 An indicator variable that takes 1 if a firm's auditor is a member of the BIG4, and 0 otherwise 
LNASSETS Log of total assets 
BUS SEG Square root of the number of business segments of a firm from Compustat’s Segment file 
FGN Foreign sales (Compustat segment file) deflated by total sales 
INV Inventory deflated by average total assets 
REC Receivables deflated by average total assets 
DEBT Sum of short term and long term debt deflated by average total assets 
INCOME Operating income after depreciation deflated by average total assets 
LOSS 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations is negative in the current or two previous years, and 0 otherwise 
AUD OPIN 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified audit opinion and 0 otherwise, 
where a modified audit opinion is defined as anything other than a standard unqualified audit 
opinion coded as 1 by Compustat 
CLIENT Square root of the number of years that a firm has been a client of its current auditor 
LITRISK 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm belongs to a high litigation industry as defined in 
Francis et al. (1994) 
LNABSTACC 
Log of the absolute value of total accruals, where total accruals is the difference between 
earnings and cash flow from operations 
LNABSBTD Log of the absolute value of the spread between pre-tax book income and taxable income 
ICD An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a qualified opinion on its internal controls 
M&A 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm engages in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), where 
sum of deal values of M&A is greater than 5% of total assets 
Additional Variables in Credit Rating Regressions  
RATINGS S&P's long-term issuer credit ratings that range from AAA (20) to D (1)  
LNINT_COV 
Log of interest coverage, computed as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to 
interest expense 
CAP_INTEN Gross PPE deflated by average total assets    
CHAEQ 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if change in shareholder equity is greater than zero, and 0 
otherwise 
RD R&D deflated by average total assets    
RET Buy-and-hold raw stock return over the past 3 years   
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SDRET Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past 3 years  
SDINCOME Standard deviation of INCOME over the past 5 years   
MB Market-to-book ratio     
AQ 
Negative one times the standard deviation of the firm-specific residuals from 5 years, where 
residuals are from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model modified by McNichols (2002) 
TRANSP 
Negative one times the squared residuals from the following regression: RET = b0 + 
b1*NIBE+b2*LOSS+b3*NIBE*LOSS+b4*CHA_NIBE+e, where RET is market adjusted returns; 
NIBE is income before extraordinary items; LOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 when 
NIBE is negative, and 0 otherwise; CHA_NIBE is change in NIBE 
GINDEX Shareholder rights governance score defined as in Gompers et al. (2003)   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N MEAN MEDIAN STDEV 1Q 3Q 
Variables in Audit Fee Regressions 
LNAUDFEES 2833 1.276 1.281 1.157 0.558 1.932 
CONF_CON 2833 0.017 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.033 
CONF_DIS 2833 0.261 0.000 0.618 0.000 1.000 
FACTOR 1858 0.000 -0.058 1.000 -0.607 0.502 
TOTAL 2833 66.730 15.000 181.504 5.000 52.000 
BIG4 2833 0.989 1.000 0.106 1.000 1.000 
LNASSETS 2833 9.197 9.215 1.086 8.427 9.940 
BUS SEG 2833 1.831 1.732 0.790 1.000 2.449 
FGN 2833 0.220 0.151 0.232 0.000 0.408 
INV 2833 0.126 0.084 0.137 0.024 0.174 
REC 2833 0.143 0.117 0.114 0.061 0.186 
DEBT 2833 0.291 0.274 0.177 0.165 0.398 
INCOME 2833 0.107 0.095 0.077 0.058 0.152 
LOSS 2833 0.246 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.000 
AUD OPIN 2833 0.619 1.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
CLIENT 2833 13.561 11.000 10.071 5.000 20.000 
LITRISK 2833 0.259 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 
LNABSTACC 2833 4.883 4.935 1.418 4.048 5.820 
LNABSBTD 2833 5.380 5.453 1.602 4.366 6.516 
ICD 2833 0.023 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 
M&A 2833 0.101 0.000 0.301 0.000 0.000 
Additional Variables in Credit Rating Regressions 
RATINGS 2158 12.780 13.000 3.038 11.000 15.000 
LNINT_COV 2158 2.169 2.104 1.037 1.474 2.761 
CAP_INTEN 2158 0.625 0.598 0.362 0.343 0.877 
CHAEQ 2158 0.463 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
RD 2158 0.016 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.019 
RET 2158 0.414 0.385 0.534 0.113 0.673 
SDRET 2158 0.097 0.087 0.049 0.063 0.116 
SDINCOME 2158 0.028 0.019 0.026 0.012 0.034 
MB 2158 3.403 2.563 3.928 1.645 4.062 
AQ 2158 -0.080 -0.030 0.156 -0.061 -0.017 
TRANSP 2158 -0.060 -0.017 0.114 -0.062 -0.003 
GINDEX 2158 9.832 10.000 2.514 8.000 11.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. See Appendix for variable 
definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles except for CON_DIS, FACTOR, TOTAL, BIG4, 
BUS SEG, LOSS, AUD OPIN, CLIENT, LITRISK, ICD, M&A, RATINGS, CHAEQ, and, GINDEX. 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Audit Fee Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 LNAUDFEES 1.00 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.40 0.23 0.33 -0.27 0.14 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.17 0.10 -0.12 0.22 0.33 0.14 -0.03 
2 CONF_CON  1.00 0.70 0.80 0.04 0.01 0.19 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.04 
3 CONF_DIS   1.00 0.60 0.22 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.04 
4 FACTOR    1.00 0.11 0.09 0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.32 -0.15 -0.06 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.16 -0.09 0.08 
5 TOTAL     1.00 0.03 0.38 0.12 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.25 0.02 0.00 
6 BIG4      1.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.02 -0.05 
7 LNASSETS       1.00 0.21 0.13 -0.40 -0.21 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.12 -0.04 0.53 0.64 0.02 0.03 
8 BUS SEG        1.00 0.09 -0.19 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.18 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.07 
9 FGN         1.00 -0.15 0.28 -0.21 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.08 -0.01 
10 INV          1.00 0.03 -0.13 0.20 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 0.27 -0.09 -0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
11 REC           1.00 -0.13 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 0.05 0.05 
12 DEBT            1.00 -0.19 0.13 0.06 -0.10 -0.23 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 
13 INCOME             1.00 -0.48 -0.16 0.08 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.12 
14 LOSS              1.00 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.16 0.13 -0.07 
15 AUD OPIN               1.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.16 0.09 -0.01 
16 CLIENT                1.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.05 
17 LITRISK                 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 LNABSTACC                  1.00 0.39 0.01 0.00 
19 LNABSBTD                   1.00 0.07 0.05 
20 ICD                    1.00 -0.03 
21 M&A                                         1.00 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Credit Rating Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 RATINGS 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.18 -0.29 0.45 -0.46 0.52 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.18 -0.12 -0.51 -0.17 0.29 -0.11 0.16 0.06 
2 CONF_CON  1.00 0.51 0.64 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.11 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
3 CONF_DIS   1.00 0.64 0.20 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.27 -0.10 -0.01 0.20 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
4 FACTOR    1.00 0.10 -0.09 0.22 -0.03 0.17 0.23 -0.11 0.00 0.15 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.16 0.01 -0.03 -0.14 
5 TOTAL     1.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.35 -0.12 -0.06 0.15 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.23 -0.02 -0.15 
6 DEBT      1.00 -0.25 0.15 -0.70 0.06 0.16 0.01 -0.28 -0.10 0.14 -0.18 -0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.00 
7 INCOME       1.00 -0.45 0.70 -0.10 -0.07 0.07 0.14 0.26 -0.26 0.03 0.46 -0.07 0.13 0.03 
8 LOSS        1.00 -0.39 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.16 0.48 0.30 -0.18 0.01 -0.24 -0.08 
9 LNINT_COV         1.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 0.30 0.18 -0.26 0.10 0.31 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 
10 LNASSETS          1.00 0.14 -0.05 0.09 -0.13 -0.24 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 -0.19 
11 CAP_INTEN           1.00 0.00 -0.19 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 0.15 0.06 0.05 
12 CHAEQ            1.00 0.04 0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 
13 RD             1.00 -0.02 0.09 0.26 0.20 -0.10 -0.14 -0.01 
14 RET              1.00 0.08 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 
15 SDRET               1.00 0.36 -0.14 0.08 -0.35 -0.11 
16 SDINCOME                1.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.17 -0.08 
17 MB                 1.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 
18 AQ                  1.00 -0.01 0.08 
19 TRANSP                   1.00 0.05 
20 GINDEX                                       1.00 
This table presents Pearson correlations for the variables used in our analyses. Panel A (B) reports Pearson correlations for the variables in the audit fee (credit 
rating) sample. Bold numbers are significant at the 0.05 level. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 
Regressions of Audit Fees on CEO Overconfidence 
                                                             
                                                       
                                                     
               
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT ? -1.886*** 0.002 -1.897*** 0.002 -2.921*** <.0001 
CONF_CON + 1.082*** 0.001         
CONF_DIS +     0.120*** 0.001     
FACTOR +         0.057** 0.022 
TOTAL ? 0.000* 0.095 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.397 
BIG4 + 0.180 0.292 0.201 0.272 0.304 0.232 
LNASSETS + 0.272*** <.0001 0.274*** <.0001 0.396***  <.0001 
BUS SEG + 0.103*** 0.001 0.097*** 0.002 0.075** 0.049 
FGN + 0.571*** 0.000 0.567*** 0.000 0.871*** <.0001 
INV + -0.796 0.944 -0.813 0.948 -0.179 0.625 
REC + 0.716* 0.068 0.702* 0.073 0.404 0.214 
DEBT + 0.381* 0.076 0.373* 0.080 0.862** 0.031 
INCOME ? -0.116 0.813 -0.095 0.847 -0.308 0.573 
LOSS + 0.121** 0.027 0.123** 0.025 0.093* 0.059 
AUD OPIN + 0.082** 0.022 0.077** 0.028 0.058 0.107 
CLIENT + -0.001 0.656 -0.001 0.670 -0.004 0.923 
LITRISK + -0.146 0.849 -0.166 0.881 -0.092 0.768 
LNABSTACC + 0.014 0.171 0.012 0.200 0.014 0.142 
LNABSBTD + 0.044*** 0.008 0.044*** 0.008 0.035** 0.042 
ICD + 0.317***  <.0001 0.331*** <.0001 0.200** 0.020 
M&A + -0.205 1.000 -0.204 1.000 -0.167 0.984 
        
R-squared  0.4713  0.4717  0.6113  
obs.   2833   2833   1858   
This table provides the results of regressing audit fees on CEO overconfidence for the audit fee sample. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year and industry indicator variables 
are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are based on 
one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 4 
Regressions of Changes in Audit Fees on Changes in CEO Overconfidence 
                                                                   
                                                 
                                                
                                     
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT ? 0.162*** <.0001 0.164*** <.0001 0.168*** <.0001 
∆CONF_CON + 0.152 0.174         
∆CONF_DIS +     0.056*** 0.010     
∆FACTOR +         -0.001 0.510 
∆TOTAL ? 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.927 
∆BIG4 + 0.055 0.323 0.054 0.324 0.258* 0.078 
∆LNASSETS + 0.219** 0.032 0.219** 0.033 0.224* 0.091 
∆BUS SEG + -0.025 0.803 -0.027 0.814 0.007 0.414 
∆FGN + 0.085 0.268 0.087 0.263 0.191 0.132 
∆INV + -0.030 0.518 -0.034 0.520 0.548 0.266 
∆REC + -0.766 0.856 -0.754 0.853 -0.253 0.675 
∆DEBT + 0.015 0.478 0.014 0.480 0.054 0.452 
∆INCOME ? -0.144 0.599 -0.147 0.591 -0.380 0.325 
∆LOSS + 0.129*** 0.009 0.130*** 0.009 0.011 0.402 
∆AUD OPIN + -0.003 0.561 -0.004 0.570 -0.009 0.646 
∆CLIENT + -0.004 0.874 -0.004 0.874 -0.002 0.667 
LITRISK + 0.006 0.411 0.007 0.390 -0.043 0.947 
∆LNABSTACC + -0.001 0.544 -0.001 0.557 0.004 0.266 
∆LNABSBTD + 0.008 0.167 0.008 0.161 0.002 0.421 
∆ICD + 0.183*** <.0001 0.181*** <.0001 0.204*** 0.000 
∆M&A + -0.018 0.644 -0.018 0.645 0.008 0.408 
        
R-squared  0.0919  0.0925  0.1120  
obs.   2343   2343   1541   
This table provides the results of regressing changes in audit fees on changes in CEO overconfidence for the audit 
fee sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year and industry 
indicator variables are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-
values are based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 5 
Ordered Logistic Regressions of Credit Ratings on CEO Overconfidence 
                                                          
                                                        
                                                     
        
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONF_CON - -1.148** 0.013         
CONF_DIS -     -0.341*** 0.005     
FACTOR -         -0.200** 0.010 
TOTAL ? 0.001 0.422 0.001 0.273 0.000 0.969 
DEBT - -1.297** 0.029 -1.236** 0.037 -1.507** 0.041 
INCOME + 5.925*** 0.001 5.803*** 0.001 6.855*** 0.002 
LOSS - -0.728*** <.0001 -0.750*** <.0001 -0.797*** 0.000 
LNINT_COV + 0.860*** <.0001 0.874*** <.0001 0.858*** <.0001 
LNASSETS + 0.918*** <.0001 0.951*** <.0001 0.984*** <.0001 
CAP_INTEN + 0.024 0.454 -0.021 0.541 0.175 0.251 
CHAEQ + 0.059 0.214 0.064 0.197 0.073 0.202 
RD ? 8.302*** 0.003 8.924*** 0.002 10.599*** 0.003 
RET ? -0.777*** <.0001 -0.786*** <.0001 -1.072*** <.0001 
SDRET - -28.852*** <.0001 -28.879*** <.0001 -29.398*** <.0001 
SDINCOME - -6.276** 0.022 -6.003** 0.025 -4.364 0.122 
MB ? 0.057*** 0.001 0.059*** 0.001 0.082*** 0.000 
AQ + -1.156 0.993 -1.126 0.992 -1.060 0.963 
TRANSP + 0.611* 0.093 0.594* 0.099 0.608 0.168 
GINDEX ? 0.074** 0.018 0.077** 0.014 0.065* 0.071 
        
obs.   2158   2158   1512   
This table provides the results of regressing credit ratings on CEO overconfidence for the credit rating sample. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year indicator variables are included. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are based on one-tailed tests 
for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 6 
Ordered Logistic Regressions of Changes in Credit Ratings on Changes in CEO Overconfidence 
            
                                                  
                                                     
                                                        
                   
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
∆CONF_CON - -1.218*** 0.004         
∆CONF_DIS -     -0.455*** 0.006     
∆FACTOR -         -0.069 0.318 
∆TOTAL ? -0.001 0.302 0.000 0.472 -0.001 0.593 
∆DEBT - -4.805*** <.0001 -4.812*** <.0001 -4.877*** <.0001 
∆INCOME + -2.455 0.862 -2.282 0.844 -1.874 0.701 
LOSS - -0.629*** <.0001 -0.615*** <.0001 -0.554*** 0.002 
∆LNINT_COV + 0.954*** <.0001 0.946*** <.0001 1.049*** <.0001 
∆LNASSETS + 1.456*** 0.000 1.462*** 0.000 1.796*** 0.000 
∆CAP_INTEN + 0.900 0.144 0.886 0.148 2.526** 0.012 
CHAEQ + 0.002 0.493 0.000 0.499 0.026 0.424 
∆RD ? 1.890 0.769 1.761 0.784 4.834 0.463 
∆RET ? 0.024 0.870 0.015 0.920 -0.048 0.788 
∆SDRET - -21.638*** <.0001 -21.494*** <.0001 -20.889*** <.0001 
∆SDINCOME - -5.848* 0.083 -6.023* 0.075 -3.953 0.251 
∆MB ? -0.008 0.587 -0.007 0.666 -0.016 0.438 
∆AQ + -0.087 0.550 -0.107 0.561 0.081 0.458 
∆TRANSP + -0.512 0.885 -0.538 0.895 -0.228 0.655 
∆GINDEX ? 0.024 0.846 0.025 0.841 0.093 0.526 
        
obs.   1789   1789   1239   
This table provides results of regressing changes in credit ratings on changes in CEO overconfidence for the credit 
rating sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year indicator 
variables are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are 
based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 7 
Binary Logistic Regressions of Credit Ratings on CEO Overconfidence 
              
                                              
                                                        
                                                     
       
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT ? -9.932*** <.0001 -10.066*** <.0001 -10.935*** <.0001 
CONF_CON - -1.112** 0.038         
CONF_DIS -     -0.358* 0.065     
FACTOR -         -0.047 0.372 
TOTAL ? -0.001* 0.092 -0.001 0.232 -0.002** 0.031 
DEBT - -2.585*** 0.009 -2.586*** 0.008 -3.956*** 0.005 
INCOME + 3.114 0.166 3.003 0.172 2.943 0.229 
LOSS - -0.846*** 0.001 -0.846*** 0.001 -0.900*** 0.009 
LNINT_COV + 0.956*** 0.000 0.955*** 0.000 0.995*** 0.003 
LNASSETS + 1.180*** <.0001 1.206*** <.0001 1.391*** <.0001 
CAP_INTEN + 0.107 0.384 0.075 0.419 0.902** 0.023 
CHAEQ + -0.237 0.944 -0.247 0.951 -0.313 0.930 
RD ? 3.439 0.424 4.081 0.355 6.315 0.356 
RET ? -0.657*** <.0001 -0.658*** <.0001 -0.881*** <.0001 
SDRET - -30.408*** <.0001 -30.423*** <.0001 -32.030*** <.0001 
SDINCOME - -7.775* 0.087 -7.573* 0.088 -11.142* 0.073 
MB ? 0.029* 0.089 0.030* 0.079 0.028 0.217 
AQ + 0.284 0.369 0.355 0.339 0.903 0.183 
TRANSP + -0.837 0.829 -0.852 0.832 -0.603 0.717 
GINDEX ? 0.160*** 0.003 0.158*** 0.004 0.142** 0.050 
        
obs.   2158   2158   1512   
This table provides results of regressing investment grade ratings on CEO overconfidence for the credit rating 
sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year indicator variables 
are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are based on 
one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
